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Description
--- Jim Warford's Triple-Trouble with the Truth ---

by Blacktail

This article was originally titled, "T-64, IT-122, and IT-130: The Soviet Advantage". It was written by Captain James M. Warford and published in Armor Magazine. Yeah, THAT James Warford --- the "Premium Tank" hoaxer whose fibs you saw unraveled earlier. He really seems to have a thing against facts and logic; in this article for example, he spins fiction-disguised-as-fact about not one tank, but THREE.

The first is a tank that he provides incorrect information about.

The second is a tank that he not only embellishes greatly, but he even names by a
designation that was never actually used by the Russians.

The third vehicle he talks about never existed!

As before, the questionable statements in the article are underlined, and my comments are in [bold and brackets].

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When a requirement for a new weapon system or combat vehicle is identified within the Soviet military, a vehicle is designed (or reverse-engineered) to satisfy that requirement. [Thank you for that in-depth analysis, Captain Obvious] Once such a vehicle is fielded it will continue to be developed and modified over a usually long active service life. [Amazingly, some people actually *spent money* to buy the magazine that had this "analysis" in it] During these in-service developmental years, the Soviets gain very valuable experience and expertise concerning the vehicle's capabilities. [Is this different from any other country? Why do we need to be told this?] It is this expertise that can give the Soviets an edge. When the time comes for a new vehicle to replace the fielded one, or the established vehicle is sent into combat, the practical experience the Soviets have acquired over the years may give them and their fielded vehicle a dangerous advantage. Such an advantage may prove to be the deciding factor on the battlefield.

[Well, that was sure a whole lot of talk about a whole lot of nothing. It shows how
low Armor Magazine's standards are that they actually published this]

While the number of vehicles that fit into the Soviet advantage category is fairly numerous, three vehicles stand out far and above the rest: the T-64 battle tank and the IT-122 and IT-130 assault guns. [The designations "IT-122" and "IT-130" were never used by the Red Army] Prior to the first public appearance of the T-62 battle tank in 1965, a new Soviet tank, designated the M1970 or T-70, was identified by western intelligence sources. [It was identified in the mid-1970s, and assumed to have entered service in about 1970 --- hence the codename. That's why the T-64 was the subject of so much drama in the West; the combined Western intel services were so bombastically incompetent, they didn't even notice a tank that had been in service since 1964] The appearance of the T-70, not only confirmed that a still older vehicle known as the T-67 [There was never any such designation --- in the East OR the West] was in fact an interim design "probably configured for vehicle running tests of the T-64's hull and the turret of the T-62," [This was an *experimental tank*, NOT a pre-production tank. Russians built these mix-'n-match "Object" vehicles all the time; how Western intelligence services came to believe this instead was a warm-up for a mass-produced design seems to have been lost to history] but, also, that the Soviets had identified the requirement for a new tank. This new tank would not be evolutionary, [unfortunately for Warford's premise, it was] as was the policy of Soviet tank designers, but instead would be revolutionary. The T-64 that was put into production in the mid-1960s appeared to be the service model of the T-70; [The tank that saw production as the "T-64" was one of several different possible configurations, including the rejected design that Warford falsely implies was called the "T-70". The Russians do this with EVERY new generation of tank; that Warford failed to notice this fact proves how much he *actually* knows about Soviet tank development trends] a tank that, according to several sources, [Here we go again, with Warford's BS Phantom Sources] never went into production.

The West was suddenly faced with a new, very modem Soviet tank that had no counterpart in any other army. The T-64 mounted the fully smoothbore 125-mm RAPIRA 3 main gun, [The "Rapira" designation is for a 100mm Towed Anti-Tank Gun --- NOT a Smoothbore 125mm Tank Gun*. Warford and pals seem to be the only people who were oblivious to this fact, as well as the fact that the T-64's main gun was designated the "D-81T"] which fired a new APFSDS round at a muzzle velocity in excess of 1,600m a second. [The Chieftain can hit a tank at 8000m and kill it with a HESH round. Where's the hype over that?] This gun, while still being the largest main gun mounted on any tank in the world, [HelOOOooo? Earth to Warford, the Chieftain had a 120mm gun that was 55 calibers long, and the 125mm D-81T is only 48 calibers long --- that makes them virtually the same overall size!] was only one aspect of the T-64's offensive capabilities. The tank was also fitted with a fully automatic loading system, [...which was first operationally employed on the French AMX-13 Light Tank, way back in the late 1940s] allowing the crew to be reduced to three men while still allowing a useful amount of 125-mm ammunition to be carried. Such a system is unusual on a Soviet tank, but was developed and fielded to fulfill an identified requirement. Another important aspect of the T-64's firepower was its fire control system, which included a coincidence rangefinder. [...which is pre-1940s tech] The adoption of such a system for fitting into a tank also marked a departure in Soviet policy. [Yeah, because they've NEVER fielded a ground-breaking new model of tank before *cough* T-34 *cough*] "While some assault guns like the IT-122 [The vehicle Warford labels the "IT-122" is in fact the SU-122/54. "SU" for "Assault Gun", "122" for the bore of it's main gun in millimeters, and "/54" as a reference too the T-54 hull is was built out of. This vehicle was almost 40 years old when Warford wrote about it using the wrong
name, and the ACTUAL designation would have known in the West by then --- unless Western intelligence services were really, REALLY incompetent (then again, the "Sovietologists" *did* fail to predict the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the Reunification of Germany, or the end of the Soviet Union!)] and IT-130 [Where are the Soviet and Russian records of a tank matching the description of this vehicle made by Warford? Where are the
accounts of crewmen, builders, and maintenance crews? Why are there no photos, videos, or eyewitness accounts of it? And why is it that the ONLY sources referring to such a machine are Warford and his cronies?] had been fitted with optical rangefinders (stereoscopic or coincidence), tanks had been equipped with only simple plestadiametric rangefinders which were not effective at long range."

The T-64 MBT

The T-64's powerplant is one of the most radical aspects of the tank's design. It consists of a 750-hp diesel engine [It only has 700hp] that represents a drastic change from conventional designs, [Which, incidentally, is rarely a successful design approach] "being a flat, five-cylinder design, with horizontally opposed pistons." Several sources [Warford cites none of these, as usual] report that the engine is plagued by problems, and is constantly breaking down. [No sh*t, Sherlock. Why do you think the first entire division of T-64s was stationed within 100 miles of the factory that makes it's powerpack?] The Soviets, however, seem to be happy with this innovative engine [Then why did they build the T-72 and T-90 with a Diesel V12, and the T-80 with a Gas Turbine? And why did the T-64's production total only 6000 tanks, built over 4 years, when they build an average of 20000] and apparently have solved the problems that confronted the British with their flat, opposed-piston engine in their early model Chieftain battle tanks. [Then why is it that both the British AND the Russians ceased to introduce new families of horizontally-opposed piston engines for tanks afterwards? Wishful thinking,
Warford-style]

Perhaps the single most discussed aspect of the T-64's design is its armor protection.
While no conclusive unclassified information has been released concerning the type of design of armor used, [It's *Laminated Steel*; the simplest kind of Composite Armor, though the T-64 was the first operational tank to use it; this was known by the 1980s, too. This type of armor is also used on the M1 Abrams, Leopard 2, and Merkava] the feasibility of fitting a T-64 era tank with composite armor (that includes a cast armor turret) has been confirmed by the design and testing carried out on the American T-95 prototype tank from 1 June 1958 to 1 August 1960. [...which is not a Soviet tank] The T-95's fused silica (glass) composite armor, [Note that Warford carefully inserts a reference to the armor used on the T95 (there's no dash in it's actual designation), so that readers will associate a type armor with the T-64 that was obviously never used in it] having been designed to defeat primarily HEAT rounds,
would fit very well into the Soviet concern over western antitank missiles (ATGMs). [You have to love Warford's train of thought in this article. According to him, the Russians are concerned about NATO's ATGM technology, so they opt to bring another cannon to a missile fight] Since it is known that the Soviets began work on composite steel/ceramic laminate armors as long ago as 1940, it can be determined that the T-64 is protected by at least a first generation of advanced armor. [Funny, I swear that Warford just said there was no conclusive information on the T-64's armor! And given that the American T95 tank prototype of the 1950s had Composite Armor, and that was before the M60 Patton --- which is known for very tough armor --- does that mean the M60 is thus "...protected by at least a first generation of advanced armor"? Nope] Whatever the exact composition of the armor turns out to be, one thing can be said for certain: the Soviets were faced with a requirement for a tank that was fitted with advanced armor, armor that was more survivable than earlier designs when faced with the growing numbers of ATGMs that it would encounter on the modern battlefield. [If you tear that statement down to it's simplest form, it reads something like, "Whatever kind of armor the T-64 has, the Soviets wanted it to be tough". That's a whole lot of gum-flapping about a whole lot of nothing]

The exact role the T-64 plays in the overall Soviet tank plan, as well as the reason the Soviets fielded a tank with the capabilities of the T-64, are the subject of much speculation. [Here's a hint; it's a tank, which are generally used to do tank things. And on the eastern side of the Iron Curtain, whose terrain is predominately flat, that means few hull-down positions, so you need to dig in pretty often; hence, the integral, collapsible Dozer Blade (for self-entrenchment) built into every Soviet MBT starting with the T-64. It also explains why the Russians have built all of their Post-War tanks very low in height, and why they don't bother adding much Gun Elevation & Depression. See? Soviet tanks aren't that hard to figure out! So, why can't Warford figure them out?] One theory is that the T-64 is the modern embodiment of the Soviet heavy tank. [Oh god, not THIS crap again. The Red Army went to great pains to supplant the Heavy Tank with MBTs in the 1940s and 50s --- why would they suddenly turn that policy upside-down?] The combination of an accurate, long range, large
caliber gun (coupled to an advanced optical/coincidence rangefinder); with what probably was the most advanced and heaviest armor of its era, might allow the T-64 to be labeled a new heavy tank. Another theory is that the T-64 is a true battle tank, designed from the ground up to fight on the battlefield of the future. [What a wonderfully-vague "theory" --- it doesn't even say what the T-64 is supposed to DO!] A third theory is that a tank like the T-64 was demanded because of the appearance of the M60A1 and Chieftain in the West. [Isn't it obvious?] These tanks, combined with the latest technological breakthroughs, brought out the weaknesses and the drawbacks of the T-62 very clearly. The Soviets needed a tank to deal with the threat from the West.

Whichever of these three theories (or any combination thereof) turn out to be correct, the Soviets have made one thing very clear: the time had come for a tank like the T-64 to be fielded. The requirement was identified and using the most modern technology available, was satisfied. [Here's a shorter, simpler, more to-the-point version of that statement that Armor Magazine's editors could have changed that into, in order to save paper and ink; "The Soviets made the T-64, because they had a requirement for it". This whole paragraph is stupid, pointless to say, and redundant]

Soviet TD Doctrine

In the Soviet Army, the tank destroyer (IT-ISTREBITEL TANKOV) [...is NOT a designation used by the Red Army! Soviet Tank Destroyers are designated "SU" --- the "IT" prefix has never been used in the Red Army for an AFV. Apparently, Warford is allergic to research] is seen as a vehicle designed from the ground up to be particularly well suited for destroying tanks. They are vehicles that combine a large caliber main gun (larger than the main gun of the tanks with which they are employed), [Could you imagine the logistical and fire control conundrums that a unit with TWO tank gun bores would face? Who would be stupid enough to try it?] heavier armor than what is possible to fit to turreted tanks, and a much larger ammunition-carrying capacity than a conventional tank. All of the above characteristics are then mated to the hull and suspension system of whatever current battle tank the Soviet Army made available. This meant that the tank destroyer could use the same hull and suspension of the tanks that were deployed with each unit they supported. According to Viktor Suvorov (the author of the book Inside the Soviet Army), "Every motor-rifle regiment (inside the USSR, but not abroad) has one battery of heavy assault guns," (tank destroyers). [Then why is it that nobody has ever SEEN them? Incidentally, "Viktor Suvorov" is the pen name of Vladimir Rezun, who has long since been discredited as a historian. Read the essay, "The Failed Historian" for further details. Of particular note in said essay is that Rezun has an awfully hard time providing honest and accurate information of Soviet armored vehicles... much like good 'ol Warford, here; www.battlefield.ru/index.php?o… ]

The IT-122, which first appeared in the Soviet Army in the 1950s, replaced the SU-100M. [It replaced the ISU-122. With a 100mm gun fitted to the T-54 in the 1940s, the SU-100 became obsolete long before the SU-122/54] This earlier vehicle gave the Soviet tank and mechanized units the ability to defeat the German Panther, Tiger I, and Tiger II tanks of WW II. [Warford seems to
have forgotten about the T-34/85] The IT-122 apparently was first seen in photographs taken of the DNIEPR exercises in 1967. They were also employed during the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. [The SU-122/54 was never deployed aboard. Ever] Again, according to Viktor Suvorov, they are employed "at times of acute tension." [Yeah, tanks generally are. And we all know how trustworthy Suvorov is. Then again, it DOES sort of make sense that Warford would cite a phony; ("Birds of a feather...") --- though on the plus side, it's not another one of his innumerable Phantom Sources] Once the situation in Czechoslovakia had been quieted, the IT-122s were returned to the Soviet Union. [They NEVER LEFT the Soviet Union --- not until after all of the survivors were converted into *engineering vehicles*, at least!]

The IT-122 itself is based on the T-54/T-55 hull and suspension with the turret removed, and replaced by a heavily armored superstructure. The main gun is the D-74 122-mm cannon. [Actually, it was a D-49. Research, Warford, research!] Perhaps the most interesting feature of the IT-122, while not overlooking the huge jump in main gun caliber over the T-54/T-55, is the mounting of a coincidence or stereoscopic rangefinder. [Yeah, because Coincidence Rangefinders were TOTALLY not pre-World War 2 technology] The device, mounted at the commander's station, "provides a very clear indication that the IT-122 was developed primarily for long range elimination of NATO heavy tanks." [You can tell this article was written by an Armor officer, because he clearly thinks everything revolves around tanks] It was not until the appearance of the T-64 in the mid-1960s that a Soviet tank was equipped with such a modern and accurate ranging system.

The IT-122 was replaced in the 1960s by the IT-130, this time mating the T-62 hull and suspension with the excellent M46 130-mm gun. [This never happened --- and that fact wasn't a secret] According to some sources, [There's that Phantom Source mojo again] the IT-130 stayed in production after the deployment of the T-64. [It never saw production, because no such vehicle was ever built AT ALL] This was probably due to the performance of the 130-mm gun. [Why would the Soviets put a Field Gun that's been finely-tuned for best *Indirect* Fire performance on a Tank Destroyer? Again, to quote Judge Judy; "If it doesn't make any sense, it's NOT TRUE."] The reason the Soviets decided to mount this field gun on a tank destroyer is two-fold. First, the gun had been available for many years, and its capabilities were very well known; [They did know it well; that's why they never put an indirect-fire gun onto a direct-fire fighting vehicle] second, the Soviets were faced with the requirement to defeat the new tanks fielded in the West. While the earlier D-74 122-mm gun was very capable, the Soviets were faced with a new problem. This started with the American M-103 and British Conqueror heavy tanks [These tanks were both catastrophes. Only a few-hundred of both were built, they saw less than 20 years of service, and they never fired a shot in combat --- just like the SU-122/54, and the non-existent IT-130] and evolved into a tank with which the Soviets became very concerned, the British Chieftain. The answer to this problem was simple: develop a heavy tank to shoot it out with these new Western tanks, [If the Soviets did this, it would have instantly inverted their 1940s decision to phase-out Heavy Tanks in favor of MBTs... which would be like re-introducing fins onto American automobiles in the 1970s. To reiterate; if it doesn't make any sense, it's NOT TRUE] or update the tank destroyer fleet by choosing a newer base vehicle and re-fielding the 130-mm gun. [And certainly not develop and field ATGM-toting Tank Destroyers based on Light Armor chassis'. Why, that would be taboo!] There is some speculation that the Soviets decided to do both; however, it is known for sure that the IT-130 was fielded. [Where's the hard evidence to back this claim?] In the same way that the SU-100 supplemented the T-34/85, [Here, Warford unwittingly lets slip the mentality of the Whoppertanktard --- that everything is somehow done they way they like it, historical evidence to the contrary be damned. The reality is that the SU-100 was used to attack fortifications and troop concentrations; busting tanks was left to Medium Tanks like the T-34/85. The publicity surrounding the T-34/85's kills against Tiger Is during the Battle of Kursk was no fluke] the IT-130 was able to provide "the high accuracy and hard punch to supplement the scores of medium smoothbore-armed tanks firing at close range on the move." In addition to the capabilities already mentioned, two more must be discussed.
First, the 130-mm gun gives the IT-130 the additional ability to provide very long range and accurate indirect fire support to suppress Western defensive/ATGM positions. [What elements of Soviet Tank Doctrine require this? And what precedent for this is there in any previous operational Soviet Tank Destroyers?] Second, the extreme size of the gun not only offers the possibility of 130-mm APFSDS ammunition, [The 130mm ammo range exists primarily for use by the towed M46 Field Gun, which can't take the recoil that an MBT-killing 130mm APFSDS round immediately entails. Why would they design a round that can't be used by the primary weapon it's ammo family is made for?] but also the possibility of a heavy metal "aluminum-based heat round, where overkill is such an important factor in armor penetration." [This betrays a fundamental ignorance of the capabilities and limitations of explosives. Aluminum Oxide doesn't explode --- it burns at a high temperature--- which is why it's used in incendiary weapons and pyrotechnic devices. The only property of an explosive that determines it's success or failure in a Shaped Charge warhead is the
velocity of the blast, and a *Low Explosive* like Aluminum Oxide is 100% WORTHLESS in this application. Moreover, Aluminum is one of the lightest metals known; it's no "heavy metal", as the author of that quote implies] It can easily be seen that the Soviet decision to field the IT-130 with the 130-mm gun may have been one of the smartest moves
the Soviet military has ever made. [This statement betrays an unspoken --- but quite obvious --- underlying conceit toward US and Western armor, that it's just so damned good, the Soviets went to THESE extremes to counter it. It's no wonder that Armor Magazine prints Warford's faulty articles; they stroke a lot of egos (i.e., "See? The Reds
think I'm tough! I'm SOOO validated!")] The M-46 130-mm field gun that was first shown to the public in May 1954, [The M-46 was more than 5 years older than that, and based on a design that originated in the early 1930s] allowed the Soviets to field a tank destroyer that was "certainly capable of defeating any NATO tank of its day."

Exactly how successful the IT-122 and IT-130 were (are) is hard to determine. [Especially since the SU-122/54 was in service for less than 10 years before being replaced by *nothing*, and the "IT-130" NEVER EXISTED! It's also worth noting where the idea came from that there was ever such a vehicle. Basically, some guys who desperately needed or wanted a "big scoop" on Soviet armor trends (perhaps someone seeking recognition and praise... or a promotion to Captain, maybe?) noticed a T-62-based Armored Recovery Vehicle on the sidelines of a parade that had a casemate-style hull. They then --- whether knowing this claim was baseless or not --- made a statement that it HAD to have been a converted Tank Destroyer, and that it used a 130mm gun. Never mind the fact
that the gun was an *indirect-fire* weapon, or that most ARVs are built with casemate hulls (e.g., the American M88 VTR... wait a second, maybe there's a super-secret-squirrel US Tank Destroyer with a 127mm gun, and the M88 was built out of it!), they saw what they wanted to see (or alternatively, and just as likely, duped YOU into seeing what THEY want you to see). It didn't matter if it were true or not, because it was dramatic, and drama sells --- and if Warford and pals are any indication, where there are career tanker writers, there's drama] The reason for this is that these two vehicles have been surrounded by an extremely high level of secrecy. [They're so highly-classified, there aren't any modern Russian records of them!] The explanation for this secrecy is not known, [Perhaps the explanation is that there ISN'T any secret. Though naturally, denial of such a weapon would only be seen by the original author would only be seen as further proof that those sneaky Soviets are hiding something --- much like the tinfoil hat-wearing UFO Conspiracy Theorists. Perhaps Warford's CVC has a lining of tinfoil in it? It would have to be a very thick layer of metal, not that it would be needed to protect his very thick skull] although the Soviets have historically been very protective of their antitank weapons. The only antitank weapons that are displayed and well known in the West are the ones that the Soviets are willing to export. "The
systems which may not be exported are never demonstrated but remain unknown from their birth, throughout their secret life and often, even after their death." [The Soviet government is also known for it's habit of concealing embarrassments --- like the SU-122/54 and T-64, for example] The Soviet ability to keep the existence of major weapon systems a secret has been demonstrated more than once in the past. Perhaps the best example of this was the total surprise the Germans experienced when suddenly faced by the T-34 in WW II. [The Germans certainly were surprised and amazed... and they STILL bulldozed through the T-34s like they were nothing. And they were; it wasn't until tankers and their leaders could scrape-up some discipline and experience that the T-34 gained the combat reputation it's so famous for today. This reflects the indisputable fact that *training* is ALWAYS more important than technology --- something that really puts a cramp in the style of Technologists like 'ol Warford here. A few other examples are the destruction of 1950s-era T-54s in the Middle East and Vietnam by 1940s-era M4 Shermans and M4 Walkers (the latter of which had 76mm guns!!!), the defeat of an entire company of T-72s in Angola by Olifant Mk.1Bs (a design that pre-dated the T-72M1, and used a smaller 105mm gun), the destruction of so many T-62s and T-72s in Operation Desert Storm by just 200 USMC M60A1s, and the loss of so many Georgian T-72s in South Ossetia to Russian T-62s] The Germans were not only not aware that the T-34 was in mass production; they were unaware that it existed. [Then the Germans were astoundingly ignorant and stupid, if there's ANY truth to Warford's claim, because the T-34 Project was more than 8 years old. Come to think of it, what does that say of the US "intelligence" community's failure to discover the T-64 until more than 5 years after the project was terminated?] Any final assessment of the IT-122 and IT-130 cannot be made without the explanation of two additional points.

IT-122

The IT-122 was not suddenly developed to solve a new problem that Soviets observed. It was fielded as the latest answer to a continual problem that was becoming more important as new vehicles were developed in the West. The IT-122 had at least two predecessors and, as mentioned above, was replaced by the IT-130. [I reiterate; the IT-130 NEVER EXISTED] The question now is, "Where will the Soviets go from here?" It is highly unlikely that the Soviets will stop with the IT-130. [Actually, there's this thing called the "Anti-Tank Guided Missile"...] The adoption of the T-64 or T-72 as a base vehicle mated to the new long barreled 152-mm field gun of the 2S5 self-propelled gun (which has been fielded since 1981) [It was fielded since the mid-1970s] would create a tank destroyer [Using a HOWITZER tube?!] that would be able to not only deal with the new special armored tanks from the West, [There's no reason to, when ATGMs fired by anything from jeeps and armored 4x4s to helicopters already accomplish this at a longer range, and an exponentially-lower miss rate. Honestly, who does this guy think he's fooling?] but also give the needed long range fire support to the aging 125-mm main gun of the newer Soviet medium tanks. [Geez, is this guy stuck in an old line of thinking or what? What do you think the AT-8 Songster ATGM --- gun-launched by said 125mm tanks --- was developed for?] The lack of detailed information, clear photographs, [...or proof of existence!] and white parade paint must not be allowed to show these Soviet tank destroyers as anything less than the real threat they are.

It's very clear from the above discussion that the Soviets were faced with requirements for new vehicles, and that these requirements were satisfied. The T-64 was needed in the mid-1960s; and once it was fielded, it caused a reaction that is still influencing tank design 18 to 20 years later. [Yep, look at all the tanks fielded since then with horizontally-opposed piston engines!] The IT-122 and IT-130 were not new concepts in the Soviet Army. [In fact, they were DEAD concepts --- which is why the SU-122/54 was cancelled after a completely pathetic 77 were made, and the IT-130 was never even *devised*] They were, instead, modern solutions to a requirement that made
itself clear during World War II. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of all three Soviet vehicles (and any vehicles that may have been developed from them) is that they have no Western equivalents. While the Western armies are equipped with modern battle tanks with many similarities to the T-64, they were fielded several years later. A comparison between them and the T-64 would therefore be one of apples and oranges. Any of the fielded Western tanks of the T-64 era were outclassed from the very beginning. The IT-122 and IT-130, on the other hand, were truly unique vehicles. There is simply no Western equivalent for these very capable tank destroyers. [So then, the Strv 103 is
"simply nothing like it"? Try again, Warford...]

When the Soviets fielded these three vehicles, they suddenly gained an advantage over the West. This advantage was first realized when the Soviets were able to identify the requirements for a new or updated vehicle and then satisfy these requirements by fielding the proper tank or tank destroyer. The Soviets have been able to use this advantage and develop it into something even more important: expertise. This expertise - 18 to 20 years old with the T-64 [It was older than that when this tripe was published --- unless Warford is commemorating the year in which the T-64's production was terminated at only 6000 vehicles after 4 years, compared to 8000 T-80s over 15 year, 8000 T-10s over 15 years, 12000 PT-76s over 15 years, 12000 T-62s over 10 years, 25000 T-72s over 35 years, and 100000+ T-54/55s over 40 years. It goes to show how "valuable" the T-64 Project's "expertise" ACTUALLY was...] and its technologies and even older with the IT-122 and IT-130 - could be a deciding factor on the battlefield. [With only 77 SU-122/54s built and all scrapped, de-milled, or converted in just 10 years, and no IT-130s EVER built, they won't be deciding anything] The Western countries, led by the U.S., missed their opportunity for the same expertise. [And here you see the true purpose of this article; it promotes the research and development of all sorts of zany, Rube-Goldbergian "superweapons", perhaps like the M1A2 Abrams the US Army was pushing for at the time. As previously described, Russia's technological edge over Germany (i.e., the T-34) had no effect whatsoever on the German invasion, until Soviet tankers had ADEQUATE TRAINING, which all overcome ANY "superior" weapon. Hitler, on the other hand, instead placed all his bets on the "Wunder Waffe", like jetfighters, guided missiles, the Panther and Tiger tanks, and so on --- and it was Germany's squandering of money on high-tech machines instead of adequately-trained men in simple machines that cost them the war, and so very much more. Warford and other Technologists gloss over these facts, preying upon the uneducated in their quest to dupe them into investing money into Technological Complexity] The various armored vehicle development policies in the West must be changed to allow a new vehicle to be fielded when it is required. [No doubt a vehicle whose manufacturer will give Warford a kickback, for helping make said vehicle's sales possible --- or at least, that's the kind of belief that people like him tend to accumulate in the US military. Decades of sucking-up to your bosses to get into (or stay in) the unit or post of your choice, and to stay employed after your next promotion is scheduled, is a learned behavior --- one you won't get to be a promoted to a Major without, like Warford eventually was promoted to] Fielding armored vehicles to satisfy specific requirements as they are identified [Note how Warford talks endlessly about these fantasy vehicles being built to satisfy "requirements", but never happens to mention what they are, or how the policies of the armies in question shape their requirements. For Technologists, Wunder Waffe is it's own justification, and the policy conforms to it afterwards] will not only allow the Western armies to maintain the pace of modem armored vehicle development, but would also provide the practical experience and expertise that will be needed to put steel on the Soviet advantage.

Description
--- Jim Warford's Triple-Trouble with the Truth ---

by Blacktail

This article was originally titled, "T-64, IT-122, and IT-130: The Soviet Advantage". It was written by Captain James M. Warford and published in Armor Magazine. Yeah, THAT James Warford --- the "Premium Tank" hoaxer whose fibs you saw unraveled earlier. He really seems to have a thing against facts and logic; in this article for example, he spins fiction-disguised-as-fact about not one tank, but THREE.

The first is a tank that he provides incorrect information about.

The second is a tank that he not only embellishes greatly, but he even names by a
designation that was never actually used by the Russians.

The third vehicle he talks about never existed!

As before, the questionable statements in the article are underlined, and my comments are in [bold and brackets].

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When a requirement for a new weapon system or combat vehicle is identified within the Soviet military, a vehicle is designed (or reverse-engineered) to satisfy that requirement. [Thank you for that in-depth analysis, Captain Obvious] Once such a vehicle is fielded it will continue to be developed and modified over a usually long active service life. [Amazingly, some people actually *spent money* to buy the magazine that had this "analysis" in it] During these in-service developmental years, the Soviets gain very valuable experience and expertise concerning the vehicle's capabilities. [Is this different from any other country? Why do we need to be told this?] It is this expertise that can give the Soviets an edge. When the time comes for a new vehicle to replace the fielded one, or the established vehicle is sent into combat, the practical experience the Soviets have acquired over the years may give them and their fielded vehicle a dangerous advantage. Such an advantage may prove to be the deciding factor on the battlefield.

[Well, that was sure a whole lot of talk about a whole lot of nothing. It shows how
low Armor Magazine's standards are that they actually published this]

While the number of vehicles that fit into the Soviet advantage category is fairly numerous, three vehicles stand out far and above the rest: the T-64 battle tank and the IT-122 and IT-130 assault guns. [The designations "IT-122" and "IT-130" were never used by the Red Army] Prior to the first public appearance of the T-62 battle tank in 1965, a new Soviet tank, designated the M1970 or T-70, was identified by western intelligence sources. [It was identified in the mid-1970s, and assumed to have entered service in about 1970 --- hence the codename. That's why the T-64 was the subject of so much drama in the West; the combined Western intel services were so bombastically incompetent, they didn't even notice a tank that had been in service since 1964] The appearance of the T-70, not only confirmed that a still older vehicle known as the T-67 [There was never any such designation --- in the East OR the West] was in fact an interim design "probably configured for vehicle running tests of the T-64's hull and the turret of the T-62," [This was an *experimental tank*, NOT a pre-production tank. Russians built these mix-'n-match "Object" vehicles all the time; how Western intelligence services came to believe this instead was a warm-up for a mass-produced design seems to have been lost to history] but, also, that the Soviets had identified the requirement for a new tank. This new tank would not be evolutionary, [unfortunately for Warford's premise, it was] as was the policy of Soviet tank designers, but instead would be revolutionary. The T-64 that was put into production in the mid-1960s appeared to be the service model of the T-70; [The tank that saw production as the "T-64" was one of several different possible configurations, including the rejected design that Warford falsely implies was called the "T-70". The Russians do this with EVERY new generation of tank; that Warford failed to notice this fact proves how much he *actually* knows about Soviet tank development trends] a tank that, according to several sources, [Here we go again, with Warford's BS Phantom Sources] never went into production.

The West was suddenly faced with a new, very modem Soviet tank that had no counterpart in any other army. The T-64 mounted the fully smoothbore 125-mm RAPIRA 3 main gun, [The "Rapira" designation is for a 100mm Towed Anti-Tank Gun --- NOT a Smoothbore 125mm Tank Gun*. Warford and pals seem to be the only people who were oblivious to this fact, as well as the fact that the T-64's main gun was designated the "D-81T"] which fired a new APFSDS round at a muzzle velocity in excess of 1,600m a second. [The Chieftain can hit a tank at 8000m and kill it with a HESH round. Where's the hype over that?] This gun, while still being the largest main gun mounted on any tank in the world, [HelOOOooo? Earth to Warford, the Chieftain had a 120mm gun that was 55 calibers long, and the 125mm D-81T is only 48 calibers long --- that makes them virtually the same overall size!] was only one aspect of the T-64's offensive capabilities. The tank was also fitted with a fully automatic loading system, [...which was first operationally employed on the French AMX-13 Light Tank, way back in the late 1940s] allowing the crew to be reduced to three men while still allowing a useful amount of 125-mm ammunition to be carried. Such a system is unusual on a Soviet tank, but was developed and fielded to fulfill an identified requirement. Another important aspect of the T-64's firepower was its fire control system, which included a coincidence rangefinder. [...which is pre-1940s tech] The adoption of such a system for fitting into a tank also marked a departure in Soviet policy. [Yeah, because they've NEVER fielded a ground-breaking new model of tank before *cough* T-34 *cough*] "While some assault guns like the IT-122 [The vehicle Warford labels the "IT-122" is in fact the SU-122/54. "SU" for "Assault Gun", "122" for the bore of it's main gun in millimeters, and "/54" as a reference too the T-54 hull is was built out of. This vehicle was almost 40 years old when Warford wrote about it using the wrong
name, and the ACTUAL designation would have known in the West by then --- unless Western intelligence services were really, REALLY incompetent (then again, the "Sovietologists" *did* fail to predict the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the Reunification of Germany, or the end of the Soviet Union!)] and IT-130 [Where are the Soviet and Russian records of a tank matching the description of this vehicle made by Warford? Where are the
accounts of crewmen, builders, and maintenance crews? Why are there no photos, videos, or eyewitness accounts of it? And why is it that the ONLY sources referring to such a machine are Warford and his cronies?] had been fitted with optical rangefinders (stereoscopic or coincidence), tanks had been equipped with only simple plestadiametric rangefinders which were not effective at long range."

The T-64 MBT

The T-64's powerplant is one of the most radical aspects of the tank's design. It consists of a 750-hp diesel engine [It only has 700hp] that represents a drastic change from conventional designs, [Which, incidentally, is rarely a successful design approach] "being a flat, five-cylinder design, with horizontally opposed pistons." Several sources [Warford cites none of these, as usual] report that the engine is plagued by problems, and is constantly breaking down. [No sh*t, Sherlock. Why do you think the first entire division of T-64s was stationed within 100 miles of the factory that makes it's powerpack?] The Soviets, however, seem to be happy with this innovative engine [Then why did they build the T-72 and T-90 with a Diesel V12, and the T-80 with a Gas Turbine? And why did the T-64's production total only 6000 tanks, built over 4 years, when they build an average of 20000] and apparently have solved the problems that confronted the British with their flat, opposed-piston engine in their early model Chieftain battle tanks. [Then why is it that both the British AND the Russians ceased to introduce new families of horizontally-opposed piston engines for tanks afterwards? Wishful thinking,
Warford-style]

Perhaps the single most discussed aspect of the T-64's design is its armor protection.
While no conclusive unclassified information has been released concerning the type of design of armor used, [It's *Laminated Steel*; the simplest kind of Composite Armor, though the T-64 was the first operational tank to use it; this was known by the 1980s, too. This type of armor is also used on the M1 Abrams, Leopard 2, and Merkava] the feasibility of fitting a T-64 era tank with composite armor (that includes a cast armor turret) has been confirmed by the design and testing carried out on the American T-95 prototype tank from 1 June 1958 to 1 August 1960. [...which is not a Soviet tank] The T-95's fused silica (glass) composite armor, [Note that Warford carefully inserts a reference to the armor used on the T95 (there's no dash in it's actual designation), so that readers will associate a type armor with the T-64 that was obviously never used in it] having been designed to defeat primarily HEAT rounds,
would fit very well into the Soviet concern over western antitank missiles (ATGMs). [You have to love Warford's train of thought in this article. According to him, the Russians are concerned about NATO's ATGM technology, so they opt to bring another cannon to a missile fight] Since it is known that the Soviets began work on composite steel/ceramic laminate armors as long ago as 1940, it can be determined that the T-64 is protected by at least a first generation of advanced armor. [Funny, I swear that Warford just said there was no conclusive information on the T-64's armor! And given that the American T95 tank prototype of the 1950s had Composite Armor, and that was before the M60 Patton --- which is known for very tough armor --- does that mean the M60 is thus "...protected by at least a first generation of advanced armor"? Nope] Whatever the exact composition of the armor turns out to be, one thing can be said for certain: the Soviets were faced with a requirement for a tank that was fitted with advanced armor, armor that was more survivable than earlier designs when faced with the growing numbers of ATGMs that it would encounter on the modern battlefield. [If you tear that statement down to it's simplest form, it reads something like, "Whatever kind of armor the T-64 has, the Soviets wanted it to be tough". That's a whole lot of gum-flapping about a whole lot of nothing]

The exact role the T-64 plays in the overall Soviet tank plan, as well as the reason the Soviets fielded a tank with the capabilities of the T-64, are the subject of much speculation. [Here's a hint; it's a tank, which are generally used to do tank things. And on the eastern side of the Iron Curtain, whose terrain is predominately flat, that means few hull-down positions, so you need to dig in pretty often; hence, the integral, collapsible Dozer Blade (for self-entrenchment) built into every Soviet MBT starting with the T-64. It also explains why the Russians have built all of their Post-War tanks very low in height, and why they don't bother adding much Gun Elevation & Depression. See? Soviet tanks aren't that hard to figure out! So, why can't Warford figure them out?] One theory is that the T-64 is the modern embodiment of the Soviet heavy tank. [Oh god, not THIS crap again. The Red Army went to great pains to supplant the Heavy Tank with MBTs in the 1940s and 50s --- why would they suddenly turn that policy upside-down?] The combination of an accurate, long range, large
caliber gun (coupled to an advanced optical/coincidence rangefinder); with what probably was the most advanced and heaviest armor of its era, might allow the T-64 to be labeled a new heavy tank. Another theory is that the T-64 is a true battle tank, designed from the ground up to fight on the battlefield of the future. [What a wonderfully-vague "theory" --- it doesn't even say what the T-64 is supposed to DO!] A third theory is that a tank like the T-64 was demanded because of the appearance of the M60A1 and Chieftain in the West. [Isn't it obvious?] These tanks, combined with the latest technological breakthroughs, brought out the weaknesses and the drawbacks of the T-62 very clearly. The Soviets needed a tank to deal with the threat from the West.

Whichever of these three theories (or any combination thereof) turn out to be correct, the Soviets have made one thing very clear: the time had come for a tank like the T-64 to be fielded. The requirement was identified and using the most modern technology available, was satisfied. [Here's a shorter, simpler, more to-the-point version of that statement that Armor Magazine's editors could have changed that into, in order to save paper and ink; "The Soviets made the T-64, because they had a requirement for it". This whole paragraph is stupid, pointless to say, and redundant]

Soviet TD Doctrine

In the Soviet Army, the tank destroyer (IT-ISTREBITEL TANKOV) [...is NOT a designation used by the Red Army! Soviet Tank Destroyers are designated "SU" --- the "IT" prefix has never been used in the Red Army for an AFV. Apparently, Warford is allergic to research] is seen as a vehicle designed from the ground up to be particularly well suited for destroying tanks. They are vehicles that combine a large caliber main gun (larger than the main gun of the tanks with which they are employed), [Could you imagine the logistical and fire control conundrums that a unit with TWO tank gun bores would face? Who would be stupid enough to try it?] heavier armor than what is possible to fit to turreted tanks, and a much larger ammunition-carrying capacity than a conventional tank. All of the above characteristics are then mated to the hull and suspension system of whatever current battle tank the Soviet Army made available. This meant that the tank destroyer could use the same hull and suspension of the tanks that were deployed with each unit they supported. According to Viktor Suvorov (the author of the book Inside the Soviet Army), "Every motor-rifle regiment (inside the USSR, but not abroad) has one battery of heavy assault guns," (tank destroyers). [Then why is it that nobody has ever SEEN them? Incidentally, "Viktor Suvorov" is the pen name of Vladimir Rezun, who has long since been discredited as a historian. Read the essay, "The Failed Historian" for further details. Of particular note in said essay is that Rezun has an awfully hard time providing honest and accurate information of Soviet armored vehicles... much like good 'ol Warford, here; www.battlefield.ru/index.php?o… ]

The IT-122, which first appeared in the Soviet Army in the 1950s, replaced the SU-100M. [It replaced the ISU-122. With a 100mm gun fitted to the T-54 in the 1940s, the SU-100 became obsolete long before the SU-122/54] This earlier vehicle gave the Soviet tank and mechanized units the ability to defeat the German Panther, Tiger I, and Tiger II tanks of WW II. [Warford seems to
have forgotten about the T-34/85] The IT-122 apparently was first seen in photographs taken of the DNIEPR exercises in 1967. They were also employed during the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. [The SU-122/54 was never deployed aboard. Ever] Again, according to Viktor Suvorov, they are employed "at times of acute tension." [Yeah, tanks generally are. And we all know how trustworthy Suvorov is. Then again, it DOES sort of make sense that Warford would cite a phony; ("Birds of a feather...") --- though on the plus side, it's not another one of his innumerable Phantom Sources] Once the situation in Czechoslovakia had been quieted, the IT-122s were returned to the Soviet Union. [They NEVER LEFT the Soviet Union --- not until after all of the survivors were converted into *engineering vehicles*, at least!]

The IT-122 itself is based on the T-54/T-55 hull and suspension with the turret removed, and replaced by a heavily armored superstructure. The main gun is the D-74 122-mm cannon. [Actually, it was a D-49. Research, Warford, research!] Perhaps the most interesting feature of the IT-122, while not overlooking the huge jump in main gun caliber over the T-54/T-55, is the mounting of a coincidence or stereoscopic rangefinder. [Yeah, because Coincidence Rangefinders were TOTALLY not pre-World War 2 technology] The device, mounted at the commander's station, "provides a very clear indication that the IT-122 was developed primarily for long range elimination of NATO heavy tanks." [You can tell this article was written by an Armor officer, because he clearly thinks everything revolves around tanks] It was not until the appearance of the T-64 in the mid-1960s that a Soviet tank was equipped with such a modern and accurate ranging system.

The IT-122 was replaced in the 1960s by the IT-130, this time mating the T-62 hull and suspension with the excellent M46 130-mm gun. [This never happened --- and that fact wasn't a secret] According to some sources, [There's that Phantom Source mojo again] the IT-130 stayed in production after the deployment of the T-64. [It never saw production, because no such vehicle was ever built AT ALL] This was probably due to the performance of the 130-mm gun. [Why would the Soviets put a Field Gun that's been finely-tuned for best *Indirect* Fire performance on a Tank Destroyer? Again, to quote Judge Judy; "If it doesn't make any sense, it's NOT TRUE."] The reason the Soviets decided to mount this field gun on a tank destroyer is two-fold. First, the gun had been available for many years, and its capabilities were very well known; [They did know it well; that's why they never put an indirect-fire gun onto a direct-fire fighting vehicle] second, the Soviets were faced with the requirement to defeat the new tanks fielded in the West. While the earlier D-74 122-mm gun was very capable, the Soviets were faced with a new problem. This started with the American M-103 and British Conqueror heavy tanks [These tanks were both catastrophes. Only a few-hundred of both were built, they saw less than 20 years of service, and they never fired a shot in combat --- just like the SU-122/54, and the non-existent IT-130] and evolved into a tank with which the Soviets became very concerned, the British Chieftain. The answer to this problem was simple: develop a heavy tank to shoot it out with these new Western tanks, [If the Soviets did this, it would have instantly inverted their 1940s decision to phase-out Heavy Tanks in favor of MBTs... which would be like re-introducing fins onto American automobiles in the 1970s. To reiterate; if it doesn't make any sense, it's NOT TRUE] or update the tank destroyer fleet by choosing a newer base vehicle and re-fielding the 130-mm gun. [And certainly not develop and field ATGM-toting Tank Destroyers based on Light Armor chassis'. Why, that would be taboo!] There is some speculation that the Soviets decided to do both; however, it is known for sure that the IT-130 was fielded. [Where's the hard evidence to back this claim?] In the same way that the SU-100 supplemented the T-34/85, [Here, Warford unwittingly lets slip the mentality of the Whoppertanktard --- that everything is somehow done they way they like it, historical evidence to the contrary be damned. The reality is that the SU-100 was used to attack fortifications and troop concentrations; busting tanks was left to Medium Tanks like the T-34/85. The publicity surrounding the T-34/85's kills against Tiger Is during the Battle of Kursk was no fluke] the IT-130 was able to provide "the high accuracy and hard punch to supplement the scores of medium smoothbore-armed tanks firing at close range on the move." In addition to the capabilities already mentioned, two more must be discussed.
First, the 130-mm gun gives the IT-130 the additional ability to provide very long range and accurate indirect fire support to suppress Western defensive/ATGM positions. [What elements of Soviet Tank Doctrine require this? And what precedent for this is there in any previous operational Soviet Tank Destroyers?] Second, the extreme size of the gun not only offers the possibility of 130-mm APFSDS ammunition, [The 130mm ammo range exists primarily for use by the towed M46 Field Gun, which can't take the recoil that an MBT-killing 130mm APFSDS round immediately entails. Why would they design a round that can't be used by the primary weapon it's ammo family is made for?] but also the possibility of a heavy metal "aluminum-based heat round, where overkill is such an important factor in armor penetration." [This betrays a fundamental ignorance of the capabilities and limitations of explosives. Aluminum Oxide doesn't explode --- it burns at a high temperature--- which is why it's used in incendiary weapons and pyrotechnic devices. The only property of an explosive that determines it's success or failure in a Shaped Charge warhead is the
velocity of the blast, and a *Low Explosive* like Aluminum Oxide is 100% WORTHLESS in this application. Moreover, Aluminum is one of the lightest metals known; it's no "heavy metal", as the author of that quote implies] It can easily be seen that the Soviet decision to field the IT-130 with the 130-mm gun may have been one of the smartest moves
the Soviet military has ever made. [This statement betrays an unspoken --- but quite obvious --- underlying conceit toward US and Western armor, that it's just so damned good, the Soviets went to THESE extremes to counter it. It's no wonder that Armor Magazine prints Warford's faulty articles; they stroke a lot of egos (i.e., "See? The Reds
think I'm tough! I'm SOOO validated!")] The M-46 130-mm field gun that was first shown to the public in May 1954, [The M-46 was more than 5 years older than that, and based on a design that originated in the early 1930s] allowed the Soviets to field a tank destroyer that was "certainly capable of defeating any NATO tank of its day."

Exactly how successful the IT-122 and IT-130 were (are) is hard to determine. [Especially since the SU-122/54 was in service for less than 10 years before being replaced by *nothing*, and the "IT-130" NEVER EXISTED! It's also worth noting where the idea came from that there was ever such a vehicle. Basically, some guys who desperately needed or wanted a "big scoop" on Soviet armor trends (perhaps someone seeking recognition and praise... or a promotion to Captain, maybe?) noticed a T-62-based Armored Recovery Vehicle on the sidelines of a parade that had a casemate-style hull. They then --- whether knowing this claim was baseless or not --- made a statement that it HAD to have been a converted Tank Destroyer, and that it used a 130mm gun. Never mind the fact
that the gun was an *indirect-fire* weapon, or that most ARVs are built with casemate hulls (e.g., the American M88 VTR... wait a second, maybe there's a super-secret-squirrel US Tank Destroyer with a 127mm gun, and the M88 was built out of it!), they saw what they wanted to see (or alternatively, and just as likely, duped YOU into seeing what THEY want you to see). It didn't matter if it were true or not, because it was dramatic, and drama sells --- and if Warford and pals are any indication, where there are career tanker writers, there's drama] The reason for this is that these two vehicles have been surrounded by an extremely high level of secrecy. [They're so highly-classified, there aren't any modern Russian records of them!] The explanation for this secrecy is not known, [Perhaps the explanation is that there ISN'T any secret. Though naturally, denial of such a weapon would only be seen by the original author would only be seen as further proof that those sneaky Soviets are hiding something --- much like the tinfoil hat-wearing UFO Conspiracy Theorists. Perhaps Warford's CVC has a lining of tinfoil in it? It would have to be a very thick layer of metal, not that it would be needed to protect his very thick skull] although the Soviets have historically been very protective of their antitank weapons. The only antitank weapons that are displayed and well known in the West are the ones that the Soviets are willing to export. "The
systems which may not be exported are never demonstrated but remain unknown from their birth, throughout their secret life and often, even after their death." [The Soviet government is also known for it's habit of concealing embarrassments --- like the SU-122/54 and T-64, for example] The Soviet ability to keep the existence of major weapon systems a secret has been demonstrated more than once in the past. Perhaps the best example of this was the total surprise the Germans experienced when suddenly faced by the T-34 in WW II. [The Germans certainly were surprised and amazed... and they STILL bulldozed through the T-34s like they were nothing. And they were; it wasn't until tankers and their leaders could scrape-up some discipline and experience that the T-34 gained the combat reputation it's so famous for today. This reflects the indisputable fact that *training* is ALWAYS more important than technology --- something that really puts a cramp in the style of Technologists like 'ol Warford here. A few other examples are the destruction of 1950s-era T-54s in the Middle East and Vietnam by 1940s-era M4 Shermans and M4 Walkers (the latter of which had 76mm guns!!!), the defeat of an entire company of T-72s in Angola by Olifant Mk.1Bs (a design that pre-dated the T-72M1, and used a smaller 105mm gun), the destruction of so many T-62s and T-72s in Operation Desert Storm by just 200 USMC M60A1s, and the loss of so many Georgian T-72s in South Ossetia to Russian T-62s] The Germans were not only not aware that the T-34 was in mass production; they were unaware that it existed. [Then the Germans were astoundingly ignorant and stupid, if there's ANY truth to Warford's claim, because the T-34 Project was more than 8 years old. Come to think of it, what does that say of the US "intelligence" community's failure to discover the T-64 until more than 5 years after the project was terminated?] Any final assessment of the IT-122 and IT-130 cannot be made without the explanation of two additional points.

IT-122

The IT-122 was not suddenly developed to solve a new problem that Soviets observed. It was fielded as the latest answer to a continual problem that was becoming more important as new vehicles were developed in the West. The IT-122 had at least two predecessors and, as mentioned above, was replaced by the IT-130. [I reiterate; the IT-130 NEVER EXISTED] The question now is, "Where will the Soviets go from here?" It is highly unlikely that the Soviets will stop with the IT-130. [Actually, there's this thing called the "Anti-Tank Guided Missile"...] The adoption of the T-64 or T-72 as a base vehicle mated to the new long barreled 152-mm field gun of the 2S5 self-propelled gun (which has been fielded since 1981) [It was fielded since the mid-1970s] would create a tank destroyer [Using a HOWITZER tube?!] that would be able to not only deal with the new special armored tanks from the West, [There's no reason to, when ATGMs fired by anything from jeeps and armored 4x4s to helicopters already accomplish this at a longer range, and an exponentially-lower miss rate. Honestly, who does this guy think he's fooling?] but also give the needed long range fire support to the aging 125-mm main gun of the newer Soviet medium tanks. [Geez, is this guy stuck in an old line of thinking or what? What do you think the AT-8 Songster ATGM --- gun-launched by said 125mm tanks --- was developed for?] The lack of detailed information, clear photographs, [...or proof of existence!] and white parade paint must not be allowed to show these Soviet tank destroyers as anything less than the real threat they are.

It's very clear from the above discussion that the Soviets were faced with requirements for new vehicles, and that these requirements were satisfied. The T-64 was needed in the mid-1960s; and once it was fielded, it caused a reaction that is still influencing tank design 18 to 20 years later. [Yep, look at all the tanks fielded since then with horizontally-opposed piston engines!] The IT-122 and IT-130 were not new concepts in the Soviet Army. [In fact, they were DEAD concepts --- which is why the SU-122/54 was cancelled after a completely pathetic 77 were made, and the IT-130 was never even *devised*] They were, instead, modern solutions to a requirement that made
itself clear during World War II. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of all three Soviet vehicles (and any vehicles that may have been developed from them) is that they have no Western equivalents. While the Western armies are equipped with modern battle tanks with many similarities to the T-64, they were fielded several years later. A comparison between them and the T-64 would therefore be one of apples and oranges. Any of the fielded Western tanks of the T-64 era were outclassed from the very beginning. The IT-122 and IT-130, on the other hand, were truly unique vehicles. There is simply no Western equivalent for these very capable tank destroyers. [So then, the Strv 103 is
"simply nothing like it"? Try again, Warford...]

When the Soviets fielded these three vehicles, they suddenly gained an advantage over the West. This advantage was first realized when the Soviets were able to identify the requirements for a new or updated vehicle and then satisfy these requirements by fielding the proper tank or tank destroyer. The Soviets have been able to use this advantage and develop it into something even more important: expertise. This expertise - 18 to 20 years old with the T-64 [It was older than that when this tripe was published --- unless Warford is commemorating the year in which the T-64's production was terminated at only 6000 vehicles after 4 years, compared to 8000 T-80s over 15 year, 8000 T-10s over 15 years, 12000 PT-76s over 15 years, 12000 T-62s over 10 years, 25000 T-72s over 35 years, and 100000+ T-54/55s over 40 years. It goes to show how "valuable" the T-64 Project's "expertise" ACTUALLY was...] and its technologies and even older with the IT-122 and IT-130 - could be a deciding factor on the battlefield. [With only 77 SU-122/54s built and all scrapped, de-milled, or converted in just 10 years, and no IT-130s EVER built, they won't be deciding anything] The Western countries, led by the U.S., missed their opportunity for the same expertise. [And here you see the true purpose of this article; it promotes the research and development of all sorts of zany, Rube-Goldbergian "superweapons", perhaps like the M1A2 Abrams the US Army was pushing for at the time. As previously described, Russia's technological edge over Germany (i.e., the T-34) had no effect whatsoever on the German invasion, until Soviet tankers had ADEQUATE TRAINING, which all overcome ANY "superior" weapon. Hitler, on the other hand, instead placed all his bets on the "Wunder Waffe", like jetfighters, guided missiles, the Panther and Tiger tanks, and so on --- and it was Germany's squandering of money on high-tech machines instead of adequately-trained men in simple machines that cost them the war, and so very much more. Warford and other Technologists gloss over these facts, preying upon the uneducated in their quest to dupe them into investing money into Technological Complexity] The various armored vehicle development policies in the West must be changed to allow a new vehicle to be fielded when it is required. [No doubt a vehicle whose manufacturer will give Warford a kickback, for helping make said vehicle's sales possible --- or at least, that's the kind of belief that people like him tend to accumulate in the US military. Decades of sucking-up to your bosses to get into (or stay in) the unit or post of your choice, and to stay employed after your next promotion is scheduled, is a learned behavior --- one you won't get to be a promoted to a Major without, like Warford eventually was promoted to] Fielding armored vehicles to satisfy specific requirements as they are identified [Note how Warford talks endlessly about these fantasy vehicles being built to satisfy "requirements", but never happens to mention what they are, or how the policies of the armies in question shape their requirements. For Technologists, Wunder Waffe is it's own justification, and the policy conforms to it afterwards] will not only allow the Western armies to maintain the pace of modem armored vehicle development, but would also provide the practical experience and expertise that will be needed to put steel on the Soviet advantage.