HOME | DD

ArgonianCitizen In reply to AskShadowRiolu [2019-07-18 12:28:59 +0000 UTC]

The Attack on Pearl Harbor[nb 3][11] was a surprise military strike by the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service upon the United States (a neutral country at the time) against the naval base at Pearl Harbor in Honolulu, Hawaii on Sunday morning, December 7, 1941. The attack led to the United States' formal entry into World War II the next day. The Japanese military leadership referred to the attack as the Hawaii Operation and Operation AI,[12][13] and as Operation Z during its planning.[14]

Attack on Pearl Harbor
Part of the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of World War II
Attack on Pearl Harbor Japanese planes view.jpg
Photograph of Battleship Row taken from a Japanese plane at the beginning of the attack. The explosion in the center is a torpedo strike on USS West Virginia. Two attacking Japanese planes can be seen: one over USS Neosho and one over the Naval Yard.
Date    December 7, 1941; 77 years ago
Location
Primarily Pearl Harbor, Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.
Result Major Japanese tactical victory; precipitated the entrance of the United States into World War II, other consequences
Belligerents
United States
Japan
Commanders and leaders
United States Navy ADM Husband E. Kimmel
LTG Walter Short
RA Robert A. Theobald
Empire of Japan VADM Chūichi Nagumo
ADM Isoroku Yamamoto
CDR Mitsuo Fuchida
Strength
8 battleships
8 cruisers
30 destroyers
4 submarines
3 USCG cutters[nb 1]
47 other ships[4]
≈390 aircraft
Mobile Unit:
6 aircraft carriers
2 battleships
2 heavy cruisers
1 light cruiser
9 destroyers
8 tankers
23 fleet submarines
5 midget submarines
414 aircraft
Casualties and losses
4 battleships sunk
4 battleships damaged
1 ex-battleship sunk
1 harbor tug sunk
3 cruisers damaged[nb 2]
3 destroyers damaged
3 other ships damaged
188 aircraft destroyed
159[6] aircraft damaged
2,335 killed
1,143 wounded
4 midget submarines sunk
1 midget submarine grounded
29 aircraft destroyed
74 aircraft damaged
64 killed
1 sailor captured[7]
Civilian casualties
68 killed[8][9]
35 wounded[10]
3 aircraft shot down
Japan intended the attack as a preventive action to keep the United States Pacific Fleet from interfering with its planned military actions in Southeast Asia against overseas territories of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and the United States. Over the course of seven hours there were coordinated Japanese attacks on the U.S.-held Philippines, Guam and Wake Island and on the British Empire in Malaya, Singapore, and Hong Kong.[15] Additionally, from the Japanese viewpoint, it was seen as a preemptive strike.[16]

The attack commenced at 7:48 a.m. Hawaiian Time (18:18 GMT).[nb 4][17] The base was attacked by 353[18] Imperial Japanese aircraft (including fighters, level and dive bombers, and torpedo bombers) in two waves, launched from six aircraft carriers.[18] All eight U.S. Navy battleships were damaged, with four sunk. All but USS Arizona were later raised, and six were returned to service and went on to fight in the war. The Japanese also sank or damaged three cruisers, three destroyers, an anti-aircraft training ship,[nb 5] and one minelayer. 188 U.S. aircraft were destroyed; 2,403 Americans were killed and 1,178 others were wounded.[20] Important base installations such as the power station, dry dock, shipyard, maintenance, and fuel and torpedo storage facilities, as well as the submarine piers and headquarters building (also home of the intelligence section) were not attacked. Japanese losses were light: 29 aircraft and five midget submarines lost, and 64 servicemen killed. One Japanese sailor, Kazuo Sakamaki, was captured.

Japan announced a declaration of war on the United States later that day (December 8 in Tokyo), but the declaration was not delivered until the following day. The following day, December 8, Congress declared war on Japan. On December 11, Germany and Italy each declared war on the U.S., which responded with a declaration of war against Germany and Italy.

There were numerous historical precedents for the unannounced military action by Japan, but the lack of any formal warning, particularly while peace negotiations were still apparently ongoing, led President Franklin D. Roosevelt to proclaim December 7, 1941, "a date which will live in infamy". Because the attack happened without a declaration of war and without explicit warning, the attack on Pearl Harbor was later judged in the Tokyo Trials to be a war crime.[21][22]

Contents
Background to conflict

Main article: Events leading to the attack on Pearl Harbor
Diplomatic background
War between Japan and the United States had been a possibility that each nation had been aware of, and planned for, since the 1920s. The relationship between the two countries was cordial enough that they remained trading partners.[23][24] Tensions did not seriously grow until Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931. Over the next decade, Japan expanded into China, leading to the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937. Japan spent considerable effort trying to isolate China, and endeavored to secure enough independent resources to attain victory on the mainland. The "Southern Operation" was designed to assist these efforts.[25]


Pearl Harbor on October 30, 1941, looking southwest
Starting in December 1937, events such as the Japanese attack on USS Panay, the Allison incident, and the Nanking Massacre swung Western public opinion sharply against Japan. Fearing Japanese expansion,[26] the United States, United Kingdom, and France assisted China with its loans for war supply contracts.[citation needed]

In 1940, Japan invaded French Indochina, attempting to stymie the flow of supplies reaching China. The United States halted shipments of airplanes, parts, machine tools, and aviation gasoline to Japan, which the latter perceived as an unfriendly act.[nb 6] The United States did not stop oil exports, however, partly because of the prevailing sentiment in Washington: given Japanese dependence on American oil, such an action was likely to be considered an extreme provocation.[16][24][27]

In mid-1940, President Franklin D. Roosevelt moved the Pacific Fleet from San Diego to Hawaii.[28] He also ordered a military buildup in the Philippines, taking both actions in the hope of discouraging Japanese aggression in the Far East. Because the Japanese high command was (mistakenly) certain any attack on the United Kingdom's Southeast Asian colonies, including Singapore,[29] would bring the U.S. into the war, a devastating preventive strike appeared to be the only way to prevent American naval interference.[30] An invasion of the Philippines was also considered necessary by Japanese war planners. The U.S. War Plan Orange had envisioned defending the Philippines with an elite force of 40,000 men; this option was never implemented due to opposition from Douglas MacArthur, who felt he would need a force ten times that size.[31][self-published source] By 1941, U.S. planners expected to abandon the Philippines at the outbreak of war. Late that year, Admiral Thomas C. Hart, commander of the Asiatic Fleet, was given orders to that effect.[32]

The U.S. finally ceased oil exports to Japan in July 1941, following the seizure of French Indochina after the Fall of France, in part because of new American restrictions on domestic oil consumption.[33] Because of this decision, Japan proceeded with plans to take the oil-rich Dutch East Indies.[nb 7] On August 17, Roosevelt warned Japan that America was prepared to take opposing steps if "neighboring countries" were attacked.[35] The Japanese were faced with a dichotomy—either withdraw from China and lose face, or seize new sources of raw materials in the resource-rich European colonies of Southeast Asia.[citation needed]

Japan and the U.S. engaged in negotiations during 1941, attempting to improve relations. In the course of these negotiations, Japan offered to withdraw from most of China and Indochina after making peace with the Nationalist government. It also proposed to adopt an independent interpretation of the Tripartite Pact and to refrain from trade discrimination, provided all other nations reciprocated. Washington rejected these proposals. Japanese Prime Minister Konoye then offered to meet with Roosevelt, but Roosevelt insisted on reaching an agreement before any meeting.[36] The U.S. ambassador to Japan repeatedly urged Roosevelt to accept the meeting, warning that it was the only way to preserve the conciliatory Konoye government and peace in the Pacific.[37] However, his recommendation was not acted upon. The Konoye government collapsed the following month, when the Japanese military rejected a withdrawal of all troops from China.[38]

Japan's final proposal, delivered on November 20, offered to withdraw from southern Indochina and to refrain from attacks in Southeast Asia, so long as the United States, United Kingdom, and Netherlands ceased aid to China and lifted their sanctions against Japan.[38] The American counter-proposal of November 26 (November 27 in Japan), the Hull note, required Japan completely evacuate China without conditions and conclude non-aggression pacts with Pacific powers. On November 26 in Japan, the day before the note's delivery, the Japanese task force left port for Pearl Harbor.[citation needed]

The Japanese intended the attack as a preventive action to keep the United States Pacific Fleet from interfering with its planned military actions in Southeast Asia against overseas territories of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and the United States. Over the course of seven hours there were coordinated Japanese attacks on the U.S.-held Philippines, Guam and Wake Island and on the British Empire in Malaya, Singapore, and Hong Kong.[15] Additionally, from the Japanese viewpoint, it was seen as a preemptive strike 'before the oil gauge ran empty'.[16]

Military planning
Preliminary planning for an attack on Pearl Harbor to protect the move into the "Southern Resource Area" (the Japanese term for the Dutch East Indies and Southeast Asia generally) had begun very early in 1941 under the auspices of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, then commanding Japan's Combined Fleet.[39] He won assent to formal planning and training for an attack from the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff only after much contention with Naval Headquarters, including a threat to resign his command.[40] Full-scale planning was underway by early spring 1941, primarily by Rear Admiral Ryūnosuke Kusaka, with assistance from Captain Minoru Genda and Yamamoto's Deputy Chief of Staff, Captain Kameto Kuroshima.[41] The planners studied the 1940 British air attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto intensively.[nb 8][nb 9]

Over the next several months, pilots were trained, equipment was adapted, and intelligence was collected. Despite these preparations, Emperor Hirohito did not approve the attack plan until November 5, after the third of four Imperial Conferences called to consider the matter.[44] Final authorization was not given by the emperor until December 1, after a majority of Japanese leaders advised him the "Hull Note" would "destroy the fruits of the China incident, endanger Manchukuo and undermine Japanese control of Korea."[45]

By late 1941, many observers believed that hostilities between the U.S. and Japan were imminent. A Gallup poll just before the attack on Pearl Harbor found that 52% of Americans expected war with Japan, 27% did not, and 21% had no opinion.[46] While U.S. Pacific bases and facilities had been placed on alert on many occasions, U.S. officials doubted Pearl Harbor would be the first target; instead, they expected the Philippines would be attacked first. This presumption was due to the threat that the air bases throughout the country and the naval base at Manila posed to sea lanes, as well as to the shipment of supplies to Japan from territory to the south.[47] They also incorrectly believed that Japan was not capable of mounting more than one major naval operation at a time.[48]

Objectives
The Japanese attack had several major aims. First, it intended to destroy important American fleet units, thereby preventing the Pacific Fleet from interfering with Japanese conquest of the Dutch East Indies and Malaya and to enable Japan to conquer Southeast Asia without interference. Second, it was hoped to buy time for Japan to consolidate its position and increase its naval strength before shipbuilding authorized by the 1940 Vinson-Walsh Act erased any chance of victory.[49][50] Third, to deliver a blow to America's ability to mobilize its forces in the Pacific, battleships were chosen as the main targets, since they were the prestige ships of any navy at the time.[49] Finally, it was hoped that the attack would undermine American morale such that the U.S. government would drop its demands contrary to Japanese interests, and would seek a compromise peace with Japan.[51][52]

Striking the Pacific Fleet at anchor in Pearl Harbor carried two distinct disadvantages: the targeted ships would be in very shallow water, so it would be relatively easy to salvage and possibly repair them; and most of the crews would survive the attack, since many would be on shore leave or would be rescued from the harbor. A further important disadvantage—this of timing, and known to the Japanese—was the absence from Pearl Harbor of all three of the U.S. Pacific Fleet's aircraft carriers (Enterprise, Lexington, and Saratoga). IJN top command was attached to Admiral Mahan's "decisive battle" doctrine, especially that of destroying the maximum number of battleships. Despite these concerns, Yamamoto decided to press ahead.[53][page needed]

Japanese confidence in their ability to achieve a short, victorious war also meant other targets in the harbor, especially the navy yard, oil tank farms, and submarine base, were ignored, since—by their thinking—the war would be over before the influence of these facilities would be felt.[54]

Approach and attack

See also: Order of battle of the Attack on Pearl Harbor

Route followed by the Japanese fleet to Pearl Harbor and back

An Imperial Japanese Navy Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighter on the aircraft carrier Akagi
On November 26, 1941, a Japanese task force (the Striking Force) of six aircraft carriers—Akagi, Kaga, Sōryū, Hiryū, Shōkaku, and Zuikaku—departed Hittokapu Bay on Kasatka (now Iterup) Island in the Kurile Islands, en route to a position northwest of Hawaii, intending to launch its 408 aircraft to attack Pearl Harbor: 360 for the two attack waves and 48 on defensive combat air patrol (CAP), including nine fighters from the first wave.

The first wave was to be the primary attack, while the second wave was to attack carriers as its first objective and cruisers as its second, with battleships as the third target.[55] The first wave carried most of the weapons to attack capital ships, mainly specially adapted Type 91 aerial torpedoes which were designed with an anti-roll mechanism and a rudder extension that let them operate in shallow water.[56] The aircrews were ordered to select the highest value targets (battleships and aircraft carriers) or, if these were not present, any other high value ships (cruisers and destroyers). First wave dive bombers were to attack ground targets. Fighters were ordered to strafe and destroy as many parked aircraft as possible to ensure they did not get into the air to intercept the bombers, especially in the first wave. When the fighters' fuel got low they were to refuel at the aircraft carriers and return to combat. Fighters were to serve CAP duties where needed, especially over U.S. airfields.[citation needed]

Before the attack commenced, the Imperial Japanese Navy launched reconnaissance floatplanes from cruisers Chikuma and Tone, one to scout over Oahu and the other over Lahaina Roads, Maui, respectively, with orders to report on U.S. fleet composition and location.[57] Reconnaissance aircraft flights risked alerting the U.S.,[58] and were not necessary. U.S. fleet composition and preparedness information in Pearl Harbor were already known due to the reports of the Japanese spy Takeo Yoshikawa. A report of the absence of the U.S. fleet in Lahaina anchorage off Maui was received from the Tone's floatplane and fleet submarine I-72.[59] Another four scout planes patrolled the area between the Japanese carrier force (the Kidō Butai) and Niihau, to detect any counterattack.[60]

Submarines
Fleet submarines I-16, I-18, I-20, I-22, and I-24 each embarked a Type A midget submarine for transport to the waters off Oahu.[61] The five I-boats left Kure Naval District on November 25, 1941.[62] On December 6, they came to within 10 nmi (19 km; 12 mi) of the mouth of Pearl Harbor[63] and launched their midget subs at about 01:00 local time on December 7.[64] At 03:42 Hawaiian Time, the minesweeper Condor spotted a midget submarine periscope southwest of the Pearl Harbor entrance buoy and alerted the destroyer Ward.[65][66] The midget may have entered Pearl Harbor. However, Ward sank another midget submarine at 06:37[66][nb 10] in the first American shots in the Pacific Theater. A midget submarine on the north side of Ford Island missed the seaplane tender Curtiss with her first torpedo and missed the attacking destroyer Monaghan with her other one before being sunk by Monaghan at 08:43.[66]

A third midget submarine, Ha-19, grounded twice, once outside the harbor entrance and again on the east side of Oahu, where it was captured on December 8.[68] Ensign Kazuo Sakamaki swam ashore and was captured by Hawaii National Guard Corporal David Akui, becoming the first Japanese prisoner of war.[nb 11] A fourth had been damaged by a depth charge attack and was abandoned by its crew before it could fire its torpedoes.[69] Japanese forces received a radio message from a midget submarine at 00:41 on December 8 claiming damage to one or more large warships inside Pearl Harbor.[70]

In 1992, 2000, and 2001, Hawaii Undersea Research Laboratory's submersibles found the wreck of the fifth midget submarine lying in three parts outside Pearl Harbor. The wreck was in the debris field where much surplus U.S. equipment was dumped after the war, including vehicles and landing craft. Both of its torpedoes were missing. This correlates with reports of two torpedoes fired at the light cruiser St. Louis at 10:04 at the entrance of Pearl Harbor, and a possible torpedo fired at destroyer Helm at 08:21.[71]

Japanese declaration of war
See also: Japanese war crimes
The attack took place before any formal declaration of war was made by Japan, but this was not Admiral Yamamoto's intention. He originally stipulated that the attack should not commence until thirty minutes after Japan had informed the United States that peace negotiations were at an end.[72] However, the attack began before the notice could be delivered. Tokyo transmitted the 5000-word notification (commonly called the "14-Part Message") in two blocks to the Japanese Embassy in Washington. Transcribing the message took too long for the Japanese ambassador to deliver it on schedule; in the event, it was not presented until more than an hour after the attack began. (In fact, U.S. code breakers had already deciphered and translated most of the message hours before he was scheduled to deliver it.)[73] The final part is sometimes described as a declaration of war. While it was viewed by a number of senior U.S government and military officials as a very strong indicator negotiations were likely to be terminated[74] and that war might break out at any moment,[75] it neither declared war nor severed diplomatic relations. A declaration of war was printed on the front page of Japan's newspapers in the evening edition of December 8 (late December 7 in the U.S.),[76] but not delivered to the U.S. government until the day after the attack.

For decades, conventional wisdom held that Japan attacked without first formally breaking diplomatic relations only because of accidents and bumbling that delayed the delivery of a document hinting at war to Washington. In 1999, however, Takeo Iguchi, a professor of law and international relations at International Christian University in Tokyo, discovered documents that pointed to a vigorous debate inside the government over how, and indeed whether, to notify Washington of Japan's intention to break off negotiations and start a war, including a December 7 entry in the war diary saying, "[O]ur deceptive diplomacy is steadily proceeding toward success." Of this, Iguchi said, "The diary shows that the army and navy did not want to give any proper declaration of war, or indeed prior notice even of the termination of negotiations ... and they clearly prevailed."[77][78]

In any event, even if the Japanese had decoded and delivered the 14-Part Message before the beginning of the attack, it would not have constituted either a formal break of diplomatic relations or a declaration of war. The final two paragraphs of the message read:

Thus the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.[79]

First wave composition

The Japanese attacked in two waves. The first wave was detected by United States Army radar at 136 nautical miles (252 km), but was misidentified as United States Army Air Forces bombers arriving from the American mainland.
Top: A: Ford Island NAS. B: Hickam Field. C: Bellows Field. D: Wheeler Field. E: Kaneohe NAS. F: Ewa MCAS. R-1: Opana Radar Station. R-2: Kawailoa RS. R-3: Kaaawa RS. G: Haleiwa. H: Kahuku. I: Wahiawa. J: Kaneohe. K: Honolulu. 0: B-17s from mainland. 1: First strike group. 1-1: Level bombers. 1–2: Torpedo bombers. 1–3: Dive bombers. 2: Second strike group. 2-1: Level bombers. 2-1F: Fighters. 2-2: Dive bombers.
Bottom: A: Wake Island. B: Midway Islands. C: Johnston Island. D: Hawaii. D-1: Oahu. 1: USS Lexington. 2: USS Enterprise. 3: First Air Fleet.

 City
 Army base
 Navy base
Attacked targets:
1: USS California
2: USS Maryland
3: USS Oklahoma
4: USS Tennessee
5: USS West Virginia
6: USS Arizona
7: USS Nevada
8: USS Pennsylvania
9: Ford Island NAS
10: Hickam field
Ignored infrastructure targets:
A: Oil storage tanks
B: CINCPAC headquarters building
C: Submarine base
D: Navy Yard
The first attack wave of 183 planes was launched north of Oahu, led by Commander Mitsuo Fuchida.[80] Six planes failed to launch due to technical difficulties.[60] It included:[nb 12]

1st Group (targets: battleships and aircraft carriers)[82]
49 Nakajima B5N Kate bombers armed with 800 kg (1760 lb) armor-piercing bombs, organized in four sections (1 failed to launch)
40 B5N bombers armed with Type 91 torpedoes, also in four sections
2nd Group – (targets: Ford Island and Wheeler Field)
51 Aichi D3A Val dive bombers armed with 550 lb (249 kg) general-purpose bombs (3 failed to launch)
3rd Group – (targets: aircraft at Ford Island, Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, Barber's Point, Kaneohe)
43 Mitsubishi A6M "Zero" fighters for air control and strafing[81] (2 failed to launch)
As the first wave approached Oahu, it was detected by the U.S. Army SCR-270 radar at Opana Point near the island's northern tip. This post had been in training mode for months, but was not yet operational.[83] The operators, Privates George Elliot Jr. and Joseph Lockard, reported a target.[84] But Lieutenant Kermit A. Tyler, a newly assigned officer at the thinly manned Intercept Center, presumed it was the scheduled arrival of six B-17 bombers from California. The Japanese planes were approaching from a direction very close (only a few degrees difference) to the bombers,[85] and while the operators had never seen a formation as large on radar, they neglected to tell Tyler of its size.[86] Tyler, for security reasons, could not tell the operators of the six B-17s that were due (even though it was widely known).[86]

As the first wave planes approached Oahu, they encountered and shot down several U.S. aircraft. At least one of these radioed a somewhat incoherent warning. Other warnings from ships off the harbor entrance were still being processed or awaiting confirmation when the attacking planes began bombing and strafing. Nevertheless, it is not clear any warnings would have had much effect even if they had been interpreted correctly and much more promptly. The results the Japanese achieved in the Philippines were essentially the same as at Pearl Harbor, though MacArthur had almost nine hours warning that the Japanese had already attacked Pearl Harbor.[citation needed]

The air portion of the attack began at 7:48 a.m. Hawaiian Time[17] (3:18 a.m. December 8 Japanese Standard Time, as kept by ships of the Kido Butai),[87][nb 4] with the attack on Kaneohe. A total of 353[18] Japanese planes in two waves reached Oahu. Slow, vulnerable torpedo bombers led the first wave, exploiting the first moments of surprise to attack the most important ships present (the battleships), while dive bombers attacked U.S. air bases across Oahu, starting with Hickam Field, the largest, and Wheeler Field, the main U.S. Army Air Forces fighter base. The 171 planes in the second wave attacked the Army Air Forces' Bellows Field near Kaneohe on the windward side of the island, and Ford Island. The only aerial opposition came from a handful of P-36 Hawks, P-40 Warhawks, and some SBD Dauntless dive bombers from the carrier Enterprise.[citation needed][nb 13]


A destroyed Vindicator at Ewa field, the victim of one of the smaller attacks on the approach to Pearl Harbor
In the first wave attack, about eight of the forty-nine 800 kg (1760 lb) armor-piercing bombs dropped hit their intended battleship targets. At least two of those bombs broke up on impact, another detonated before penetrating an unarmored deck, and one was a dud. Thirteen of the forty torpedoes hit battleships, and four torpedoes hit other ships.[88] Men aboard U.S. ships awoke to the sounds of alarms, bombs exploding, and gunfire, prompting bleary-eyed men to dress as they ran to General Quarters stations. (The famous message, "Air raid Pearl Harbor. This is not drill.",[nb 14] was sent from the headquarters of Patrol Wing Two, the first senior Hawaiian command to respond.) The defenders were very unprepared. Ammunition lockers were locked, aircraft parked wingtip to wingtip in the open to prevent sabotage,[89] guns unmanned (none of the Navy's 5"/38s, only a quarter of its machine guns, and only four of 31 Army batteries got in action).[89] Despite this low alert status, many American military personnel responded effectively during the attack.[citation needed][nb 15] Ensign Joe Taussig Jr., aboard Nevada, commanded the ship's antiaircraft guns and was severely wounded, but continued to be on post. Lt. Commander F. J. Thomas commanded Nevada in the captain's absence and got her under way until the ship was grounded at 9:10 a.m.[90] One of the destroyers, Aylwin, got underway with only four officers aboard, all ensigns, none with more than a year's sea duty; she operated at sea for 36 hours before her commanding officer managed to get back aboard.[91] Captain Mervyn Bennion, commanding West Virginia, led his men until he was cut down by fragments from a bomb which hit Tennessee, moored alongside.[citation needed]

Second wave composition
The second planned wave consisted of 171 planes: 54 B5Ns, 81 D3As, and 36 A6Ms, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Shigekazu Shimazaki.[81] Four planes failed to launch because of technical difficulties.[60] This wave and its targets comprised:[81]

1st Group – 54 B5Ns armed with 550 lb (249 kg) and 132 lb (60 kg) general-purpose bombs[82]
27 B5Ns – aircraft and hangars on Kaneohe, Ford Island, and Barbers Point
27 B5Ns – hangars and aircraft on Hickam Field
2nd Group (targets: aircraft carriers and cruisers)
78 D3As armed with 550 lb (249 kg) general-purpose bombs, in four sections (3 aborted)
3rd Group – (targets: aircraft at Ford Island, Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, Barber's Point, Kaneohe)
35 A6Ms for defense and strafing (1 aborted)
The second wave was divided into three groups. One was tasked to attack Kāneʻohe, the rest Pearl Harbor proper. The separate sections arrived at the attack point almost simultaneously from several directions.

American casualties and damage

👍: 1 ⏩: 2

Atompunk456 In reply to ArgonianCitizen [2021-04-10 13:47:24 +0000 UTC]

👍: 1 ⏩: 0

AskShadowRiolu In reply to ArgonianCitizen [2019-07-23 04:23:55 +0000 UTC]

But I'm Hawaiian.

👍: 0 ⏩: 1

DAN-THE-POOCHYENA In reply to AskShadowRiolu [2019-10-04 19:00:49 +0000 UTC]

Pearl Harbor happened on Hawaii...

👍: 0 ⏩: 1

AskShadowRiolu In reply to DAN-THE-POOCHYENA [2019-10-06 21:49:26 +0000 UTC]

👍: 0 ⏩: 1

DAN-THE-POOCHYENA In reply to AskShadowRiolu [2019-10-06 23:28:07 +0000 UTC]

More like F to pay respects

👍: 0 ⏩: 0

AnonIsnothere In reply to LadyMosiacSlime [2019-05-23 02:13:03 +0000 UTC]

Remoraid is based off a revolver so he could have a fun time

👍: 0 ⏩: 1

LadyMosiacSlime In reply to AnonIsnothere [2019-05-23 11:23:49 +0000 UTC]

Remoraid rouleete

👍: 0 ⏩: 1

AnonIsnothere In reply to LadyMosiacSlime [2019-05-23 14:13:43 +0000 UTC]

Now im gonna try it with a ram ranch revolver.

👍: 0 ⏩: 1

LadyMosiacSlime In reply to AnonIsnothere [2019-05-23 16:43:53 +0000 UTC]

oof

👍: 0 ⏩: 0

DelightfulDiamond7 In reply to 3dmarioworld [2018-12-19 02:42:10 +0000 UTC]

well I respect your opinion pal.

👍: 0 ⏩: 1

3dmarioworld In reply to DelightfulDiamond7 [2018-12-19 04:01:30 +0000 UTC]

Likewise. 👍: 0 ⏩: 0

DelightfulDiamond7 In reply to The9Lord [2018-10-31 00:08:55 +0000 UTC]

Well, I respect you and everyone opinion fellow deviant.

👍: 0 ⏩: 1

The9Lord In reply to DelightfulDiamond7 [2018-10-31 00:13:48 +0000 UTC]

glad you do ;w;

👍: 0 ⏩: 0

DelightfulDiamond7 In reply to Pac-Man357 [2018-10-30 23:27:07 +0000 UTC]

Glad you like it fellow deviant.

👍: 0 ⏩: 0

DelightfulDiamond7 In reply to XLivixal-FantasyX [2018-10-30 21:23:41 +0000 UTC]

Yup

👍: 0 ⏩: 0

DelightfulDiamond7 In reply to Empoleon77 [2018-10-30 20:27:57 +0000 UTC]

You are right about that the final boss was not good at least they try to make a good final boss besides it's your opinion and you should be proud of that fellow deviant don't listen to the people who get butthurt people who think the game is perfect or this character is perfect they all have flaws.

👍: 0 ⏩: 1

Empoleon77 In reply to DelightfulDiamond7 [2018-10-30 20:29:01 +0000 UTC]

I mean, the first phase was decent, arguably the best boss in the game. But the second phase... Ah... It seems I am already having flashbacks.

👍: 0 ⏩: 1

DelightfulDiamond7 In reply to Empoleon77 [2018-10-30 21:23:29 +0000 UTC]

First phase pretty great second phase not good but hey at least the ending was good after fighting the final boss anyway I better get back to work on drawing have a great day or night.

👍: 0 ⏩: 1

Empoleon77 In reply to DelightfulDiamond7 [2018-10-31 10:56:59 +0000 UTC]

Ah.

👍: 0 ⏩: 0

DelightfulDiamond7 In reply to oddkiid [2018-10-30 20:08:04 +0000 UTC]

Same here same here

👍: 0 ⏩: 0